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One of the basic needs of developing countries is the economic
infrastructure that is the basis of growth and development in other sectors
of the economy. The lack of proper response to financing needs in this
sector will result in economic development that faces major challenges
anddifficulties. Designing an optimal solution to financing these types of
projects is thus, a fundamental need. These projects have two main
characteristics that should be considered in the financing method. The
first is long-term period to constructing and the second is the high cost of
implementation. The use of Islamic financial innovations based on
Islamic contracts can meet many of these needs.States in developing
countries have so far preferred to raise fund based on debt, ignoring the
fact that this kind of financing and choice of method will cause many
problems for the economy. Financial crises and economic stability,
creating a leverage in the economy, budget deficit, inflation and the
distribution of risk among economic agents are the issues that affect the
structures and models of financing. IstisnaSukukhas the potential to be
used for infrastructure project financing and can be combined with other
contracts, including Ijarah and Musharakah, for these types of projects. In
this paper, various models are presented and examined to show that by
adapting the financial flows of state-owned projects with real economy,
especially in the field of infrastructure, the macroeconomic imbalances
can be avoided. This is most relevant in the "Istisna-Musharakah-Stock"
model.
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1. Introduction
There are some reports from international institutions which indicate developing countries have issue
to financing their infrastructure projects. These types of project have two key elements: long-term and
high cost. Generally,there are two methods to financing projects. 1. Debt financing. 2. Equity financing.
The states of these countries usually provide funds based on debt financing. Unfortunately, the states
make a lot of problems in their economy by choosing this approach.
Nowadays, the main problem has involved the global economy is increase in unrestrained debtand the
more important factor is risk of repayment by the states. The risk of payment by the state not only has bad
effect on recession, but also it can create a systemic risk and by contagion exposes the other sectors of
economy. According to the unfavourable terms prevailing in economic growth,the ability to repayment
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debt is suspected. Regarding to this point 75% of financial products are debt based. Usually the states face
budget deficit and they cannot settle their commitments. In this situation they choose borrowing by the
debt instruments or print the money. For the first option, the consequences are explained earlier. The
second one creates some problems in the economy as well as the first one. It means that by printing new
money, it increases inflation in the economy and the consequence is the loss of fixed income instrument
owners. This is only one of the effects of the high inflation in the economy and other effects are ignored
here.
Therefore, the idea is that financing based on equity is better for all stakeholders in society; because
the economy does not have imbalance as a whole andthe investment follows the real economy without
any crisis in the financial system. Hence, this paper focuses on a method that it does not have the
problems of debt financing and it is useful for the states, especially for Islamic developing countries. As a
case, there are a lot of infrastructure projects in Islamic Republic of Iran and the state has some issues to
financing these projects. As the financial system of Iran is integrated Islamic system since 1979(Islamic
Revolution) the state has issued Musharakah Sukuk to complete or construct the infrastructure projects,
however, these instruments are based on profit loss sharing but in operation they are similar to
conventional bonds.
2. Literature Review
Many researchers have examined the ways in which a government can enhance the provision of
infrastructure in various sectors through private sector participation (Akindele&Iwisi, 2006; O'Neill,
2010). In recent years, many researchers exploring new instrument from Islamic finance (Rosly, 2010;
Al-Salem, 2009, Maurer, 2010), but most of them are related to the banking sector. However, some of
researches focus on analysing the Islamic project financing in infrastructure (Wilson, 1998;Camacho
2005; Alexander 2011; Hassan et al,2006; McMillen, 2007) and discus the participation of the
government and private sector. In accordance with shariah for financing major projects, most of them are
descriptive in nature and remain limited. However, some researchers (Alexander, 2011; Amin, 2008;
Gavin, 2010) developed Islamic project financing for housing and energy project. Financing based on
sukuk applied to a broad variety of projects (Zarqa, 1997; Kordvani, 2009; Maurer, 2010) that discus the
innovation in Islamic sukuk and its capability for financing infrastructure and some aspects of this sukuk.
2.1. Istisna contract
An istisna agreement is a deferred delivery contract, where one party provides investment capital and
the other agrees to deliver a specific asset to a purchaser, in turn, makes a separate arrangement with the
investor to pay for the asset plus a pre-agreed profit. Istisna contracts offer some flexibility- financing
may be delivered up front or in installment, and the delivery date does not have to be fixed. In addition,
these contracts may be revoked up until the time that the party receive the financing has begun to
manufacture the goods or to begin construction.In the other words, Istisna refers to a contract to sell to a
purchaser a non-existent asset that is to be constructed, built or manufactured according to the agreed
specifications and delivered on a specified future date at a predetermined price of the istisna` asset. (Bank
Negara Malaysia, 2014).
Istisna contracts are useful when an individual wants to borrow money to build a home. The home
cannot be considered a tangible asset until it is built. With no basis in an asset, the transaction would be
considered a riba-based loan. Istisna contracts allow a homebuyer to finance the project and eventually
take ownership of the newly constructed house (Morris & Salam, 2009).
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2.2. Definition of Sukuk
An Islamic financial certificate is similar to a bond in Western finance, that complies with Shariah,
Islamic religious law. However, the traditional Western interest paying bond structure is not permissible.
Sukuk involves the selling of Islamic bonds by the bank to an investor group that then rents the bonds
back to the bank for a predetermined rental fee. The bank also makes a contractual promise to buy back
the bond at a future date at par value (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007; Hakim, 2007; Saadalah, 2007;
Mcmillen, 2007; Sidani, 2007; Salim, 2015).
Sukuk offers a number of solutions in Islamic project finance. One structure of particular interest in
project finance is sukuk istisna’ a (SAI) or commission to start the project. This structure allows project
sponsors to leverage their project in an Islamic fashion and is useful where predelivery financing is
required (Merna, Chu and Al-Thani, 2010).
2.3. Sukuk al-Istina
Sukuk al-istisna is the certificate of equal value that is issued for the purpose of mobilising funds to be
used in the production of the goods owned by the certificate holder. The funds raised from subscription
are the cost of products and intended products became owned by the certificate issuers, producers
(seller/supplier) and subscribers. The certificate holders own the product and they become entitled to the
sale of a parallel istisna. Sukuk al-istisna is very convenient for financing huge infrastructure projects
(Dincer and Hacioglu, 2014).
Istisna’ sukuk are only redeemable at maturity but they can be transferred at face value before that
date. As always with Islamic financial products the purchasers of the sukuk run the risk of certificates
losing value if market price for the produced items falls. This is unlikely in the case of long-term
infrastructure products (Spoors, 2014).
The structure of sukuk al-istisna has not been that widely used. Although, at first glance, the structure
appears ideal for the financing of greenfield development, certain structural drawbacks have proven
difficult to overcome and, as a result, sukuk al-istisna has not featured as an alternative source of Islamic
funding on multi-sourced project financing in the manner once predicted. In addition to this, the different
approaches taken by Shariah scholars to advance rentals and istisna termination payments have also led
structures to consider other more ‘flexible’ structures (such as sukuk al-musharaka)*.
There are varieties of methods that can be adopted in structuring sukuk (Islamic financial certificates)
using istisna’ contract. This article will give a brief explanation on how istisna’ contract is employed in
sukuk structure by illustrating two samples of istisna’ sukuk models.
In the modern day context of Islamic finance, the istisna’ has developed into a particularly useful tool
in the Islamic funding of the construction phase of a project – it is often regarded as being similar to a
fixed-price ‘turnkey’ contract. In order to enable investors to receive a return during the period where
assets are being constructed under an istisna arrangement, some Shariah scholars have permitted the use
* http://www.islamicbanker.com/education/sukuk-al-istisna
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of a forward lease arrangement (known as ijaramawsufah f al-dimmah) alongside such istisna’
arrangement.
In other words, the sukuk evidence financial obligation of the sukuk issuer to make payment to the
investors at an agreed future date. It is also common that istisna’ sukuk are issued by issuers to represent
the undivided right and ownership of the investors over the underlying asset in the istisna’ transaction.
3. Operational Model of Istisna’ Sukuk
3.1. Istisna’ sukuk to represent istisna’ selling prices
As mentioned above, the issuance of istisna’ sukuk indicates the right of investors, that is sukuk
holders, over the selling price due to deferment of price settlement. This can always be seen in a parallel
istisna’, which involves two contracting parties in both transactions. In the first istisna’ contract, the
originator (issuer) agrees to construct istisna’ asset and deliver it to the investors on a future date. In
return, the price settlement by the investors is payable by lump sum or in phases, according to the stages
of completion of the asset. Subsequently, both parties sign separate istisna’ agreement, in which the
investors agree to construct the asset and deliver it to the originator. In the second istisna’ contract, the
istisna’ sale price, which comprises purchasing price plus profit, will be paid by the originator on a future
date. The deferment of price settlement renders the originator indebted to the investors. Pursuant to this,
the originator-cum-issuer will issue sukuk as evidence of the originator’s responsibility to fulfill its
financial obligation to the investors. The issuance is also to represent the investors’ ownership over the
receivables owed by the originators. The basic structure is illustrated in the following table (Badri and
Mikail, 2014).
Fig 1. Istisna’ sukuk transaction structure (Model 1)
1. Under istisna’ purchase agreement, the originator (issuer) agrees to construct an identified
istisna’ asset and deliver it to the investors in consideration of an agreed istisna’ purchase price.
2. The istisna’ purchase will be paid by the investor in one lump sum or by stages at a specified
time. The proceeds will be used to finance the project.
3. Subsequently, the investors enter into second istisna’ transaction (istisna’ sale agreement) and
agree to construct the identified istisna’ asset for the originator. The selling price which is made
up of the original asset purchase price and the profit margin is payable according to an agreed
payment schedule.
4. The originator (issuer) will issue sukuk to the investors as evidence for issuer’s financial
obligation on the settlement of the price.
5. The payment will be settled in periodical basis, for example, semi-annual. The sukuk shall be
redeemable upon maturity (Badri and Mikail, 2014).
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3.2. Istisna’ sukuk to represent istisna’ asset
Some sukuk issuances represent a proportionate right and ownership interest towards the istisna’ asset
instead of evidencing deferred selling price. In that method, it is common that Special Vehicle Purpose
(SPV) is initially established to act as a trustee to the investors (sukuk holders). Firstly, the SPV raises
fund by inviting interested investors to finance a specific project. Upon receiving the proceeds from the
investors, the SPV will issue sukuk to the investors. The flow of istisna’ transaction begins with the SPV
executing an istisna’ contract with a contractor requesting it to manufacture the identified istisna’ asset.
Therefore, at this stage the sukuk holders possess a proportionate right and ownership interest over the
istisna’ asset. Hence, in this sukuk transaction, the certificates issued by SPV to the investors serves as
right of ownership over the underlying asset of the istisna’ transaction. Once the project is completed, the
asset is sold to a third party, and the payment (principal plus profit) will be distributed to investors.
It is also a common practice that ijarah (leasing) arrangement is combined with istisna’ arrangement.
During the construction period, the third party will rent the istisna’ asset under the principle of
ijarahmawsufah fi dhimmah (forward lease). This combination enables the investors to enjoy periodical
return in the form of rental fee during the construction of the asset. The flow of transactions is depicted in
the diagram below (Table 2).
Fig 2. Istisna’a sukuk transaction structure (Model 2)
1. The issuance proceeds received by SPV (as trustee of sukuk investors) are used to finance
construction projects.
2. Sukuk are issued to investors by SPV.
3. SPV executes an istisna’ contract with a contractor to build an identified asset which is to be delivered
on a specified future date.
4. The istisna’ purchase price is settled on staged basis and at specified times.
5. During the construction, the SPV leases the istisna’ asset under the principle of ijarahmawsufah fi
dhimmah (forward lease).
6. The end user will pay the rental to SPV at an agreed formula. Proceeds received from the end user is
distributed to investors periodically e.g. semi-annual basis until maturity.
77 Davood Manzoor et al./Journal of Emerging Economies and Islamic Research (2017) Vol. 5, No. 3
7. Upon completion of the project, the asset is sold and delivered to the end user (Badri and Mikail,
2014).
3.3. International istisna’ sukuk issuance
Figure 3 shows statistics about Istisna’ Sukuk issuance over fifteen years, 2001 to 2015. It is obvious
that proportion of istisna’ sukuk has been less than 4%. Also Figure 4 shows global sukuk issuance by
underlying contract. Comparing both sides of Figure 4, evolution in contract is evident. Istisna based
sukuk have fallen in proportion.
Fig 3. Structural Break-Up of Domestic Corporate Sukuk Issuances (Jan 2001- March 2015, USD Millions) type
4. Infrastructure projects
The main factors of infrastructure projects especially in Iran are:
1. They are almost monopolized by the states and they need huge funds to complete.
2. After construction (setting up) period the projects make money for several years.
3. High operation leverage; it means that the fixed cost is the greatest part of total cost here.
According to finance principle, it is not acceptable that such projects are financed by debt instruments
or financial leverage. The best manner is financing through equity or quasi equity instruments. In absence
of these types of instruments states shift to debt based instruments.
Obviously in a financial system that is based on obligation on a certain profit payment from the first
day and through the construction phase that does not have any flow, produced by the project, the
originator has to pay a portion of profit in mentioned period and in another side the total payment of the
profit to investors usually are lower than their expectation.
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Regarding to the points the following part describes a new model for financing infrastructure projects
by the public sector. We define some different scenarios with a comparative approach to find advantages
and disadvantages of them.
5. The Model
The key element of our model for different scenarios is based on issuing Istisna’ Sukuk. As mentioned
earlier by fixed income instruments, the states have to pay a huge amount of money just from the first
phase of the project (during the construction), while the project has not have any payoff. Istisna’ Sukuk
without any payment (coupon) is the best method of financing to away from these unreasonable
commitment.
a. The constructor which is also the originator establishes SPV, as the agent of the investors.
b. The istisna’ contract is between the SPV and the originator.
c. The SPV by issuing the IstisnaSukuk raises funds and step by step; according to progress of the
project the funds are payable to constructor.
d. During the construction, the SPV as the agent of the investors, is the owner of the project and the
originator is the constructor (Diagram1).
Fig 4. Issuing IstisnaSukuk
1. In this stage the originator stablishes the SPV.
2. The SPV chooses a trustee, (a central securities depository can have this role).
3. The Rating Agency rates the Sukuk.
4. The SPV by issuing the Istisna’ Sukuk raises funds.
5. Step by step, according to progress of the project the funds are payable to the constructor. The
SPV invests the residual in a secure way.
Investors
SPV
Originator
Trustee Rating
Agency
1
2
4
3
5
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5.1. Different Scenarios
After construction under a new contract the originator and SPV agree to choose different scenarios:
Fig 5. Different scenarios
As shown in Diagram 2, it can define three types of method to continue the process of financing.
Exploitation phase is the second stage and IPO is the third one.
5.2. Musharakah-IPO
It means that after construction, under a new contract the originator and SPV agree to musharakah not
based on initial investment but, the share of investor is more than the originator in profit,and also the loss
is based on the initial investment in order to attract and encourage the investor.
Advantages of Musharakah-IPO:
1. As described in introduction, one of the problems of debt financing is lack of connection
between the real sector and financial sector. In this way we have peer to peer connection by real
sector and it is based on risk sharing fundamentals.
2. Flexibility of this process is another advantage by the originator perspective. It meansthat there
is no fixed commitment through the project against the issuing conventional bonds. By the
issuing of conventional bonds, the originator should pay a determined amount of money
regardless of the situation of the project in reality.
3. As the project is based on Musharakah, the capital and profit guarantee are excluded. This
subject causes the supervision mechanism by the third party and it declines the agency problem.
Hence, there are no conflict of interest and asymmetric information; in other words, the
supervision will be the pillar of the process.
IST
ISN
A  
CO
NT
RA
CT
MUSHARAKAHH CONVERT TOEQUITY
IJARAH CONVERT TOEQUITY
IJARAH THUMMALBAY
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Disadvantages of Musharakah-IPO:
1. Usually the investors are risk averse and maybe in comparison with other options they prefer to
invest in lower risk options.
2. The monitoring in this method is costly if we do not have prerequisites of monitoring and
supervision.
The process for this stage is shown in Diagram 3.
Fig 6. Musharaka model
Based on the primary agreement in accordance with project timing, the profit is payable. As said, for
making sensitivity for the investors the profit is higher than the initial investment versus the originator,
but the loss is based on the initial investment for two parties.
5.3. The third stage of the investment
Usually these types of projects have the maturity stage (for example after 5 years). In this level, the
Musharakah Sukuk can convert to the stock. We define an embedded option for the third part of
investment that the investor can convert its Sukuk to stock.
Advantages of IPO:
1. The size of government is a problem in economy, converting Musharakah to stock helps the
efficiency of the government and finally the owners of the project are the private sector, so the
government size is reduced.By this way, people who are the main stakeholder will be the stock
holder.
2. We restrict the commitment payment of Sukuk all at once.
5.4. Ijarah- IPO
After construction under a new contract the originator and SPV agree to lease during this period. In
this situation they have also put an embedded option for the investor to convert its Sukuk to stock.
Advantages:
1. Ijarah Sukuk is fixed income and in comparison with Musharakah is attractive for the risk
averse investors.
Profit Distribution
Originator
SPV
Investor
Trustee
Profit Distribution
Supervision
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Disadvantages:
1. The flexibility of Ijarah is lower than the Musharakah.
2. The Ijarah makes commitment for the originator and it will be concerned about paying the
coupon.
Fig 7. Ijarah model
By this approach after the exploitation phase, like the previous model the investor has the right of
converting his Istisna- Ijarah Sukuk to stock.
5.5. Ijarah thumma al-bay
After construction under a new contract the originator and SPV agree to lease during this period. In
this model the originator has to pay the rent of the project (asset) to the investors for 5 years (for
example). By the last payment of the rent plus a premium, the originator acquire the asset and will be the
owner of the asset. (Ijarah thumma al-bay).
Advantages:
1. The contractor is the last owner of the asset.
2. The investor receives the fixed income and the risk is lower.
3. The pricing of the securities is not complex.
Disadvantages:
1. The advantages that mentioned for risk sharing is fading out.
2. The nature of financing is similar to debt financing.
Originator
SPV
Investor
Trustee
Lease payments
Paying coupon (rent)
Supervision
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Fig 8. Ijarahthumma al-bay Model
The case:
Supposedly that the originator (Ministry of Petroleum) needs 400 billion Dollars to establishing and
setting up a specific refinery, and the originator brings 150 billion Dollars. The project is expected to
construct within 4 years. The originator negotiates with investors before issuance of securities. After the
agreement, investors are committing to a syndicate of 8 investors. The investors according to work
progression of  8 times provide the funds to the project (50 billion at each time); assuming that each
Sukuk certificate value is 100,000Dollars. After construction period the exploitation of the project for 6
years is started. In this period the originator and investors unlike the initial investment (27%, 73%) agree
to 10% and 90% proportion of profit. This amount of proportion is just for encouraging the investors,
based on the agreement.
The 6 years exploitation period has been a period of Musharaktah. At the end of the 10th year, the
project is prepared for initial public offering in stock market and the convertible Istisna-Musharakah
Sukuk would be converted to stock. One of the advantages of this approach is awarding more stock to the
sukuk holders. Finally, the third advantage is increasing the capital value at IPO stage. Indeed the pricing
of this project in this time is completely different from the value of the initial price in the beginning.
Therefore, the investors and the originator at the end of 10th year not only depreciate the value of their
capital, but also in addition to profit in exploitation period, they can gain from the value appreciation in
IPO stage.
Originator
SPV
Investor
Trustee
Lease payments (last payment=rent +premium)
Paying coupon (rent)
Supervision
1 2 3 4 5
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Fig 9. The case
6. Conclusion
States in developing countries have so far preferred to raise fund based on debt, ignoring the fact that
this kind of financing and choice of this method will cause many problems for the stability of the
economy. Considering the issues of financial crises and economic stability, creating a leverage in the
economy, budget deficit, inflation and the distribution of risk among economic agents are the issues that
affect the structures and models of financing.
Istisna’ Sukuk is an Islamic instrument which has the potential to be used to infrastructure
projectfinancing. Istisna’ Sukuk is based on the asset and the return of the project it is completely
compatible with the infrastructure project specially in developing countries. Therefore, by presenting
these considerations, the various models presented will be examined and we will show that by adapting
the financial flows of state-owned projects with real economy, especially in the field of infrastructure, the
macroeconomic imbalances can be avoided. This is most relevant in the "Istisna-Musharakah-Stock"
model. The presented model is a sustainable option, could be choosen.
Generally speaking, the main problem of debt financing is disconnecting between repayments of loan
on one side and the risk of the project and cash flow of the asset on another side. It looks like the states
and the authority of the financial markets should choose different approach. To conclude the best way for
financing infrastructure is using risk sharing financial instruments. By this approach these securities not
only are the beneficiate instruments for the real economy, but it can also stop the current procedures of
creating and accumulation of debt. In addition, they operate countercyclical instead of procyclical
operation by the bonds and debt instruments.
Investors
SPV
Originator
Trustee
10
90
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